Thomas Aquinas on Natural Law
Thomas Aquinas discusses natural law in his Summa Theologiae. In Part II/1 of this work, he considers whether natural law is the same for all humans, whether it is a habit, whether it can be “excised from the hearts of human beings,” and whether laws can be revised or revoked (Klima, Allhoff, & Vaidya, 2007, p. 368). This page will specifically focus on Question 97 of his Summa Theologiae, in which Aquinas discusses the revision of laws. His thoughts on this matter are timeless, and have been influential on ethics, politics, and religion throughout history.
In Question 97, Aquinas discusses positive law - that is, man-made law - in relation to natural law, and whether or not positive law can be revised. Aquinas addresses four concerns in regard to the revision of law (Klima, et al.):
1. “Should human law be revised in any way?”
2. “Should human laws always be revised for something better?”
3. “Can customs obtain the force of law?”
4. “Can the people’s rulers dispense subjects from human laws?”
Aquinas believed that human law can be revised, but that it should only be revised when necessary - and even then, only sparingly. He believed that human law should remain unchanged because it is based on natural law, which is unchangeable; if natural law is unchangeable, then it follows that its derivative should be, as well. Aquinas also wrote, “Measures ought to be most permanent" (Klima, et al., p. 370); and as human law is the measure of human actions, human law ought to be permanent. Lastly, natural law is “just and upright,” and things that are “just and upright” will always be so (Klima, et al.). Therefore, positive laws should always be laws.
A thorough writer, Aquinas also presents a sample argument contrary to his. One opposed to his thoughts, he himself says, might cite Augustine’s On Free Choice: “Temporal law, although just, can be justly revised over time” (Klima, et al.).
Aquinas does not deny this; in fact, he gives two reasons why laws might be justly revised. The first reason is reason advances from imperfect to perfect, and positive law is based on human reason; therefore, as human reason improves, so might human law. Second, positive law regards human actions, and human actions can change with changing conditions; therefore, as human circumstances can change, so can human law.
With this in mind, Aquinas clarifies his position. Natural law, as he said, is immutable, but human reason is not. Similarly, natural law consists of permanent rules, while human law consists of rules regarding different, changing scenarios. It is therefore impossible, Aquinas concedes, for human law to remain unchanged. However, he maintains that it ought to be as permanent as natural law.
But if human law can be revised, should it be revised for something better? Aquinas felt that it should be. He draws an analogy to support his view: man’s reason is the source of man’s laws; likewise, man’s reason is the source of man’s skills. Human skills require rules, but old rules are frequently revised for better rules. Therefore, so should human laws be revised in favor of better laws. Aquinas also points out that “many unsuitable things would result if human laws were not revised by adding better provisions, since the laws of antiquity were unsophisticated in many respects” (Klima, et al., p. 371). Finally, Aquinas draws on Aristotle’s Ethics, saying that laws are designed for actions, but that knowledge of actions can only come from experience, which, according to Aristotle, “takes time” (Klima, et al.).
The counter-argument Aquinas gives here is from Gratian's Decretum: “It is foolish and rather detestably shameful to allow the traditions of our forefathers to be modified” (Klima, et al.).
But, Aquinas counters, positive law is only revised to the extent that its revision serves the public welfare. He concedes that the revision of laws can erode customs – which account for much of the observance of laws - and thereby reduce “the binding force of law” (Klima, et al., p. 371). Because of this, Aquinas said, “we should not rush to revise laws” (Klima, et al., p. 372). Nevertheless, he believed it ought to be done in the case of a revision with a clear and great benefit, or in the case of a law that is clearly unjust.
As mentioned above, Aquinas believed customs could affect positive law. He therefore explored whether or not customs themselves can “obtain the force of law” (Klima, et al., p. 372). At first, it would seem that they couldn’t. First of all, positive law comes from natural law, which comes from divine law. Human customs can change neither natural nor divine law; it appears, therefore, that they cannot change human law, either. Secondly, law is known to be “morally good” (Klima, et al.). But “good cannot come out of many wicked acts,” and one who breaks the law acts “wickedly” (Klima, et al.). If breaking the law is wicked, then it cannot produce anything good; therefore, breaking the law cannot produce new laws. Finally, customs are a product of individuals, whereas laws are the products of a group; therefore, customs cannot become laws.
However, Aquinas cites Augustine as saying, “We should consider the customs of God’s people… as laws” (Klima, et al., p. 372). Aquinas agrees, writing that customs are nothing more than repeated words or acts which “explain the internal movements and thoughts of human reason” (Klima, et al.). Since customs explain laws, they also have – in some cases - the ability to change them and to take the force of law. For example, customs that oppose divine or natural law cannot become laws. Customs that are not morally evil and result from a flawed law can become laws, but the law will prevail over the custom if the law is a just one.
This leads Aquinas to wonder whether rulers can dispense – that is, excuse - their subjects from human laws. One might think that they cannot, because laws are established for the common good, and “the common good should not be cast aside for the private convenience of a particular person” (Klima, et al., p. 373). Aquinas also notes that the Bible – specifically, Deuteronomy 1:17 – says that one should not “regard who anyone is,” since one’s “judgment is God’s” (Klima, et al.). Therefore, for a ruler to give a dispensation to a subject would be to regard who that subject is, and to defy divine law. Positive law must be in harmony with natural and divine law – but humans cannot excuse someone from either natural or divine law, and therefore they should not be able to excuse someone from human law.
But, Aquinas points out, “the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 9:17: ‘Dispensation has been entrusted to me’” (Klima, et al., p. 374). Aquinas says that dispensation amounts to giving goods to individuals, which may become necessary in times of “clear and present danger” (Klima, et al.). Likewise, a dispensation may bring about more harm than good, as it could be inappropriate for an individual, “bring about some evil,” or “prevent something better” (Klima, et al.).
Because of this, Aquinas says that rulers should grant dispensations wisely. Equality does not matter in the case of dispensations, for “there is no regard for who persons are if unequal things are dispensed to persons who are unequal” (Klima, et al.). Aquinas concludes that dispensations should only be granted when they benefit the common good, and rulers can only grant dispensations from human law, not from divine or natural law.
John Duns Scotus on Natural Law
Like Aquinas, John Duns Scotus also focuses on the validity of laws, and whether or not they can be revoked. In book three of his Ordinatio, he discusses the Ten Commandments - called the Decalogue - in relation to natural law. The major concern in this work of Scotus’ is whether the Ten Commandments belong to natural law, and whether God has the power to alter natural law or revoke part of the Ten Commandments. This was a religious and philosophical conundrum for medieval thinkers: if certain things are immutably evil, then how could God rescind his commandments and order men to commit these acts? He certainly seems to have done so, as in the case of ordering Abraham to sacrifice his son, among other things.
To make sense of this, Duns Scotus first analyzes natural law. Natural law, according to him, is “either a practical principle known immediately from its terms or necessary conclusions that follow from such principles” (Klima, et al., p. 375). These basic principles have a truth prior to and regardless of any human actions. The natural law is compulsory for everyone, regardless of religion or culture, because “it is known what such a nature [the natural law] must do and must not do” (Klima, et al., p. 376), while the Decalogue was not known to humans before it was revealed to them.
In other words, natural law consists of rules that humans understand innately, such as rules barring murder and theft. The Ten Commandments, while based on the natural law, contain additional rules that are not innately understood by all peoples (such as the rule barring idolatry or the rule barring work on the Sabbath). Since it is the most basic and generally understood law, natural law is the law that everyone must follow.
According to Scotus, there are two ways that things can belong to natural law. The first way is when something is known to be true from its “terms” or from “conclusions necessarily entailed” by it (Klima, et al., p. 377). These things are natural law in the literal sense. The second way something can belong to natural law is by being “exceedingly in harmony” with it (Klima, et al., p. 378).
Broadly speaking, Duns Scotus feels that all of the commandments fall under natural law. Specifically, he thinks the first table of the Decalogue is natural law in the literal sense, and that the second table is part of natural law because its contents are in harmony with natural law.
The first two commandments belong to natural law because certain “conclusions” are “necessarily entailed” by them (Klima, et al., p. 377). Some of the first commandments state “You shall not have other gods before me” and “You shall not take the name of the Lord, your God, in vain” (Klima, et al.); it logically follows, then, that “he [God] alone must be loved as God… nothing else must be worshiped as God, nor must any irreverence be shown to him” (Klima, et al., p. 378). In other words, if these commandments are accepted as true, then it follows that nothing but God must be worshiped; these are practical principles. And these commandments must be true, Scotus thinks, since “God’s existence could have been inferred by natural reason from principles known in themselves…” (Klima, et al., p. 381).
The third commandment (forbidding work on the Sabbath and requiring worship on that day) may or may not be natural law. Scotus has some doubts about this because “it is not clear how one could infer that a person is bound then or now to worship God and… how anyone is bound at some undefined time to do so…” (Klima, et al.). Yet if one is not bound to worship God at any definite time, then God could dispense people from this commandment – but that would not be probable, because doing so would mean that people could live their entire lives without ever showing affection to God.
The second table of commandments falls under natural law in that they are in harmony with it. This is true, Scotus says, because “their rightness is very much in harmony with the first practical principles that are known of necessity” (Klima, et al.). Furthermore, the second table’s contents logically follow the first table’s, making them conclusions entailed by the first table, and therefore also natural law.
When it comes to dispensation from laws both natural and divine, Duns Scotus presents the specific view that all of the Ten Commandments pertain to natural laws. This view holds that natural laws come from true fundamental principles; the mind naturally favors those truths, and the will therefore obeys. The content of the Decalogue is based on these principles; therefore, every command in the Decalogue is good in and of itself, and everything prohibited in the Decalogue is intrinsically evil. People with this view believe that acts such as killing are always evil, regardless of circumstances; but then, when confronted with Biblical instances where killing was declared good, they explain that God makes distinctions between killing an innocent and killing an aggressor, and a dispensation would be given in the latter scenario.
But Scotus does not agree; he believes that a dispensation does not uphold a law while allowing an individual to break it, but must revoke or clarify the law. Furthermore, this argument concedes of the possibility of dispensation for killing; by admitting that some of the commandments can be revoked, this view proves Duns Scotus’ point that the second table of the Decalogue does not belong to natural law in the strict sense.
Despite this, Scotus seems to feel that God does not grant dispensation from either natural law or the Decalogue, but that certain laws are clarified over time. For example, although God’s existence can be inferred without revelation, “ignorant people” would not have known this if it had not been revealed in the Decalogue (Klima, et al., p. 381). Likewise, it could be inferred that certain lusts are against the natural law, but “corrupt men” might not be able to make such a judgment (Klima, et al.); it was therefore necessary for this to be explained through the Ten Commandments.
Duns Scotus also explains that, while every commandment should be followed, in the state of beatitude, it would be clarified that one would not have to honor one’s parents in the sense of honoring them with “what is necessary to sustain life” because “there no one will need such help” (Klima, et al.).
Finally, Duns Scotus takes up the issue of God ordering the Jews to despoil the Egyptians. In this case, he says, God did not exempt them from the law, or revoke it. God is the higher owner of all property; he can transfer the ownership of property, regardless of the lower owners’ feelings. If God transferred the ownership of the Egyptians’ property to the Jews, then the Jews would not have been stealing when they despoiled the Egyptians. Similarly, God, as judge, “could have compelled the Egyptians” to give the Jews the wages they deserved; and so if the Jews accepted their wages and appropriated them, they would not have been stealing (Klima, et al.).
And so John Duns Scotus did not believe that God could give dispensations, exactly, but that He could clarify the circumstances in which a certain action can or cannot be done. It was through these clarifications, Duns Scotus explains, that God allowed humans to commit acts that, at first glance, seem to be against the Decalogue, and therefore against natural law, as well.
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Both Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus wrote on natural law – what it is, and how it affects humans. Aquinas focused more on the ways that natural law affects positive law, and whether or not positive laws can or should be altered. Duns Scotus followed a similar line of thought, but instead focused on the ways that natural law affects divine law, and whether or not divine law can be altered. Both men were part of the Scholastic movement in medieval Western Europe, and both were heavily influenced by the writings of ancient thinkers such as Aristotle and by Christianity.
Notes:
-Positive law is a law that has been created by a government or other authority, whereas natural law is derived from nature and is present with or without government.
-Gratian's Decretum, an anthology of over three thousand texts relating to religion, compiled by a Benedictine monk named Gratian. This became the source for canon law, but it was also a treatise meant to resolve discrepancies between rules collected from different sources.
-The Decalogue is a fourteenth century term for The Ten Commandments.
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