X.6
Notice the difference Aristotle draws between being happy and being amused. Is
he being too crusty in holding that there is such a distinction, or is he
simply being accurate?
X.7-8
For most of the Nicomachean Ethics
(books II-IX, and perhaps even book I), Aristotle is
holding up as the ideally good life the life of practical (as opposed to
theoretical) wisdom and social virtues. We have an especially clear statement
of this in IX.9, and the importance of the life of action over the life of
contemplation is discussed as early as 1105b5-18.
Even in his discussion of the intellectual virtues, the virtue he concentrates on is phronesis. (This is translated by Ross as “practical wisdom” and by Irwin as “intelligence.” Irwin’s rendering misses the point that phronesis is aimed at action [praxis, the root of “practical”], and so misses an important element of the term.) Note for example 1140a26-28: “Indeed the person of practical wisdom seems able to deliberate well about the things good for him and useful...” (my translation).
Yet by the time we get through X.7-8, we have Aristotle saying, “And so happiness will be some kind of contemplation.” (Contemplation is Ross’ rendering of theoria, which Irwin gives as “study.” It makes little sense to say either that I can theorein or contemplate the baseball standings; but I can study the standings, and hence I prefer Ross’ translation of this term to Irwin’s.) The question then arises “What gives?” Is there a plausible way to make the contemplative strain of X.7-8 consistent with the rest of the work?
One solution which has been attempted is to hold that Aristotle thinks that the social virtues are means towards contemplation, and so are, somewhat like external goods, not themselves the happy life, but rather pre-conditions for the happy life. This would solve the apparent tension between his two strains of thought.
But there are at least two problems with this suggestion (though both may be soluble). First, does relegating the social virtues to being mere means do justice to the emphasis which Aristotle has put on them for so many books? (Remember all that talk about courage, generosity, wittiness, etc.)
Second, how exactly could one think that being courageous, generous, and witty would facilitate one’s contemplation? Would not the life of social life interfere with the life of contemplation? (And keep in mind that according to Aristotle, the best contemplation is contemplation of the best things, e.g., the stars, heavenly orbits, god.)
Well? Any suggestions?
X.9
Notice how in this chapter Aristotle leads right in to his next work, The
Politics. How could contemplating reality (as opposed, say, to studying
society) make one a better legislator?
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