Outline for Mill’s Utilitarianism, Ch. 2
(using the pagination of George Sher’s 2nd edition from Hackett Publishing, 2001)
Michael Taber
St. Mary's College of Maryland

p. 6

"Utility" means "pleasure & exemption from pain."

p. 7, para. 2

principle of utility "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reversal of happiness."
Happiness defined as "pleasure and absence of pain."
Unhappiness defined as "pain and privation of pleasure."
2 assumptions noted: 1) The only things desirable as ends are pleasure & freedom from pain. 2) All desirable things are desirable either for their inherent pleasure or as a means to pleasure.

para. 3

Objection: A life that has no higher end than pleasure is not worthy of mankind.

para. 4

Mill’s reply: The objector forgets that there are intellectual pleasures, and that utilitarians think them qualitatively superior to the pig pleasures. Surely this is worthy of mankind.

p. 8, para. 2

To judge which of 2 pleasures is qualitatively superior, consult someone who is competently acquainted with both.

p. 9, para. 2

Proof that intellectual pleasures are superior: few, if any, humans would prefer to become changed into an animal, even if they were guaranteed as many pig pleasures as they could possibly wish for.

p. 10, para. 1

It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.

para. 2

Objection: But some people who have tried both pleasures become tempted by the pig pleasures and forego the higher pleasures. So, by p. 8, para. 2, it would follow that the pig pleasures are (at least sometimes) qualitatively superior to the intellectual pleasures.

 

Mill’s reply: This does not count as an objection, because no one voluntarily chooses the low pleasures; such people have no choice because they have already become (at least temporarily) incapable of enjoying the higher pleasures.

p. 11, para. 3

Right actions are only attainable through the "general cultivation of nobleness of character."

p. 12, para. 3

Objections to the principle of utility: Happiness cannot be the end of all action, because (a) it is unattainable and (b) even if it is attainable in principle, people can do very well without it.

para. 4

Mill’s replies: (a) is false because by "happiness" I mean not a continuously pleasurable state, but only moments of pleasure, and surely that is attainable.

p. 13, para. 2

The happiest life is a blend of tranquility & excitement, moments of pleasure separated by intervals of repose from past pleasures and of anticipation & preparation for future pleasures

p. 14, para. 2

By nature, everyone can enjoy the intellectual pleasures

p. 15, para. 2

And (b) is false because although people can do without their own happiness (e.g., martyrs), they cannot do without the happiness of others.

p. 16, para. 3

It is not the sacrifice itself that is good, but rather the consequential happiness brought about by the sacrifice.

p. 17, para. 2

The happiness of all is involved; one must deliberate disinterestedly. The golden rule is compatible with utilitarianism.

 

Society should:

1) place the happiness of the individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the happiness of the whole;

2) educate everyone so that they realize the intimate connection between individual happiness & the happiness of the whole.

p. 18, para. 1

People who think that it is the motive of an action, not its consequences, that is relevant to its rightness or wrongness, confuse the rule of action with the motive for action; motive is no rule.

 

"He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble."

footnote:  Rightness depends on the intention (i.e., on what the agent wills to do), not on the motive (i.e., on the feeling that causes him to will to do it).  Rarely do we need to consider explicitly the consequences for everyone, because most of our actions are, as a matter of fact, intended for our benefit.

p. 20, para. 2

Objection: Utilitarianism renders men cold and calculating, unfeeling. Mill’s reply: Utilitarianism does no such thing; it simply declares that feelings don’t enter into the rightness of actions, though it’s perfectly all right for a person to have feelings.

 

Right actions do not always indicate a good character, because such actions might proceed from bad motives. But that’s okay because utilitarianism purports to be only a theory of right action, not of good character, so it’s okay if motives are ignored.

p. 22, para. 1

Utilitarianism is compatible with theism in general, and with Christianity in particular.

(Notice the emergence of rule with utilitarianism in these two replies.)

p. 23, para. 1

Objection: Utilitarianism encourages expedient actions, and these are wrong. Mill’s reply: If "expedient" means "that which is in the sole interest of the agent," then utilitarianism surely does not encourage such actions. If "expedient" means "that which violates a rule the observance of which is more right than any action," then utilitarianism does not encourage such expedient actions. For example, if the rule "Do not lie" is right in a higher degree than any action (i.e., if that rule conduces to the general happiness), then utilitarianism does not encourage an expedient lie. (Except a lie which would, for example, save someone’s life, but all moral theories must recognize such exceptions).

p. 23, para. 2

Objection: Utilitarianism requires that we take time before each action to calculate the consequences; but such a view is absurd. Mill’s reply: We don’t need to calculate anew before each action, but rather we can usually use the experience which history teaches us, e.g., that murder and theft are hurtful to mankind. We can employ such secondary principles.

p. 25, para. 2

Most of the other objections against utilitarianism can be silenced that there will be counter examples for any moral theory.

Send me mail:  mstaber at smcm dot edu

Return to my handouts page.

Go to Michael Taber's home page.

Go to the SMCM home page.